company:syria today

“In #Libya, as in #Syria today, Western intervention was supposedly in support of #democracy, but was conducted in alliance with the Sunni absolute monarchies of the #Gulf who had no such aims”
▻http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-west-is-silent-as-libya-falls-into-the-abyss-9833489.html #monarchy

The Syrian War and “Sectarianism” | Dissent Magazine
▻http://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/the-syrian-war-and-sectarianism

When we insist in light of these facts that Syria’s conflict is not sectarian, we don’t mean to suggest that the religious hatred seen in Syria today is somehow just a myth. Instead, we are arguing that sectarian violence should be seen as the result of these specific political and economic developments, rather than their cause—something that we would instinctively recognize when thinking about parallel issues in our own country.

#Syrie
#communautarisme
#religions

►http://seenthis.net/messages/205134 @kassem
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Seymour Hersh : Obama "Cherry-Picked" Intelligence on Syrian Chemical Attack to Justify U.S. Strike | Democracy Now !
►http://www.democracynow.org/2013/12/9/seymour_hersh_obama_cherry_picked_intelligence

AMY GOODMAN: And why this is significant today? In the end, President Obama chose not to strike Syria because the American people just overwhelmingly said no. But what this means for what’s happening in Syria today? And also, why then did the Syrian—

SEYMOUR HERSH: Let me interrupt you, Amy.

AMY GOODMAN: Yes.

SEYMOUR HERSH: Amy, let me interrupt you. He didn’t—I’m telling you, he didn’t do it because the American people said no. He knew it because he didn’t have a case. And there was incredible opposition that will be, one of these days, written about, maybe in history books. There was incredible operation from some very, very strong-minded, constitutionally minded people in the Pentagon. That’s the real story. I don’t have it; I could just tell you I know it.

And so, it wasn’t just a case—you know, from the military’s point of view, this was a president who many respected in many ways. There’s many good things about Obama. There’s a lot of things—as I said, I voted for him twice. And he’s probably going to be the brightest president we’re ever going to have, and maybe the best president we’re ever going to have. The system is—doesn’t produce always the very best, our system. But the fact of the matter is that this president was going to go to a war because he felt he had to protect what he said about a red line. That’s what it was about, in the military’s point of view. And that’s not acceptable. You don’t go to war, you don’t throw missiles at a country, when there’s no immediate national security to the United States. And you don’t even talk about it in public. That’s wrong, and that was a terrible thing to do.

And that’s what this story is really about. It’s about a president choosing to make political use of a war crime and not do the right thing. And I think that’s—to me, Amy, that’s a lot more important than where it was published and who told me no and who told me yes. I know the press likes to focus on that stuff, but that’s not the story. The story is what he was going to do, and what it says maybe about him, what it says about that office, what it says about the power, that you can simply—you can create a narrative, which he did, and you know the mainstream press is going to carry out that narrative.

I mean, it’s almost impossible for some of the mainstream newspapers, who have consistently supported the administration. This is after we had the WMD scandal, when everybody wanted to be on the team. It turns out our job, as newspaper people, is not to be on the team. You know, we’ve got a world run by a lot of yahoos and wackos, and it’s our job as reporters to do the kind of work and make it hard for the nincompoops that run the world to get away with some of the stuff we’re doing. That’s what we should be doing more and more of. And that’s just—you know, I don’t think there’s any virtue in it; it’s just the job we have. And there’s heroism—you know, there’s nothing heroic about what we do. It’s heroic for some of the people, reporters in Africa, to do some of that work when they’re at personal risk. We’re not at personal risk. It’s just not so hard to hold the people in office to the highest standard. And the press should be doing it more and more.

#Seymour_Hersh

Moscow : No Strike Against Syria This Week
▻http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/moscow-no-strike-against-syria-week

He went on to reveal that there are approximately 17,000 Russian citizens that remain in Syria today, who work as “experts” in various state institutions, and it is the duty of Moscow to protect them from any bodily harm. He explained that there are no plans to evacuate them for the time being, confirming that a few hundred families have departed by way of Beirut in the last few days.

iyad_elbaghdadi
This is the final final version of your tweet session. I believe it is complete.

#Syria OK guys, I’m starting an important tweet session on #Syria and Islamist/Jihadist fears. I urge you to pay attention.

This may be all over the place because I’m typing as I go, so please do have patience with me. #Syria

As many of you know, I’ve been warning about #Syria becoming a Jihadist magnet for nearly a year now.

For example, I tweeted this some six months ago: bit.ly/PkOI40 - and we may be witnessing it happening. #Syria

What ticks me off is when everything is jumbled into the statement “There are Alqaeda in #Syria”.

So I’m going to try to do what I can do demystify this maze of Islamism & Salafism & Jihadism & and how they relate to #Syria's revolution.

I’ll have to start with “Islamism”, notoriously difficult to define. #Syria

Islamism is a wide spectrum. The acid test for an Islamist is they believe Islam has something to say beyond the personal sphere. #Syria

Non-Islamists (Seculars) are happy enough with Islam being restricted strictly to private life. #Syria

That there is a wide umbrella. There are all sorts of people under that “Islamist” umbrella. But I’ll focus on what’s relevant for #Syria.

What’s urgently relevant for #Syria concerns these titles: Salafi, Jihadi, Alqaeda, Takfiri. Yes, there’re not all one and the same.

Why this is significant is because you have to know a group’s ideology to predict what it will or won’t do. #Syria

Today in #Syria there are both Salafi & non-Salafi Islamists, and there are a few Jihadists. No Alqaeda link is proven and no Takfiris.

A useful generalization is that Islamism is the superset, and Salafis, Jihadis, Alqaeda are successive subsets. #Syria

Salafis are Islamists but not all Islamists are Salafis. #Syria

Jihadis are Salafis but not all Salafis are Jihadis. #Syria

Alqaeda are Jihadi Salafis but not all Jihadi Salafis are Alqaeda. #Syria

So I guess I have to start with Salafism, another word that causes so much confusion. #Syria

I have to distinguish between Salafism as a Sunni school of jurisprudence and as a specific socio-political group. #Syria

As a Sunni school, Salafism is a legitimate “manhaj” (or method) associated mostly with Hanbali jurisprudence. #Syria

As a socio-political group, Salafism refers to certain groups with known leaders, political positions, and spheres of influence. #Syria

When we use “Salafi” today we mostly mean the socio-political group. Specific positions, leaders, a religious hierarchy. #Syria

I think I’ll have to take a step back here and talk about what distinguishes Salafis from other Islamists wrt political vision. #Syria

Islamists generally believe the Prophet established a unique form of government in Medina, an Islamic state. #Syria

Islamists are deeply divided about how much of this “state” is mandated, and how much is open to human interpretation. #Syria

Salafis generally tend towards looking upon the entire early Islamic political experience as religiously mandated. #Syria

(This itself is contradictory since the early Islamic state did not have a religious police for example, but I digress.) #Syria

Most Muslims (and many Islamists) believe that modern democratic instutions are compatible with Islam. #Syria

Salafis however tend to reject democracy since it entails putting Islam to the vote rather than mandating or establishing it. #Syria

So if you speak to an Islamist who rejects democracy he’s probably a Salafi. Not Alqaeda, just Salafi. #Syria

#Eypt's recent experience tells us that even this is flexible. Salafis who for years badmouthed democracy eventually formed parties. #Syria

Now lemme establish how this applies to #Syria specifically. We hear “Jihadi” a lot, it’s actually short for “Jihadi Salafism”.

Salafism itself is deeply divided into mainstream (or government-approved, or Islahi) Salafism and Jihadi Salafism. #Syria

Islahi Salafis wish to bring about their vision through reform ("Islah"), by propagation while coexisting with current regimes. #Syria

Such Salafis have an unspoken win-win with rulers - they can preach, so long they teach people that revolt is a form of corruption. #Syria

That’s how you understand the positions of certain Salafi leaders towards the Arab Spring, Mubarak, and SCAF. #Syria

Diametrically opposite are Jihadi Salafis, who believe that their vision of an Islamic state can only be achieved through making war. #Syria

Salafi Jihadis consider virtually all modern Muslim rulers to be infidels, and consider anyone who works for them to be an infidel. #Syria

For Salafi Jihadis, anyone who willingly serves in Assad’s army, or works directly for him, is under suspicion of having apostatized. #Syria

Salafis (all, not just Jihadi) are notorious for extreme enmity towards what they consider heretical Islamic sects, especially Shias. #Syria

Anti-Shiism fits the agendas of some governments who pour more gas on the fire, allowing overt sectarianism in the name of Salafism. #Syria

So, recapping - Some Muslims are Islamists, some Islamists are Salafi, and some Salafis are Jihadist. Now on to Alqaeda. #Syria

Alqaeda is a Jihadi Salafi organization but it doesn’t have a monopoly there. Not every Jihadi Salafist is an Alqaeda. #Syria

There just isn’t any evidence so far that any group in #Syria has organizational or operational links with Alqaeda.

Many have unfortunately pinned the label “Alqaeda” on anyone raising the black-and-white Islamic flag. Kinda ticks me off. #Syria

The black & white banner has been an Islamic symbol for centuries. Alqaeda uses it, but they don’t own its copyrights. #Syria

The black flag does not equal Alqaeda. It means Islamists. How do you know?Check if they’re raising another flag next to it. #Syria

Jihadi Salafis do not believe in the nation-state and deride the word “watan” (nation) as a “wathan” (idol). #Syria

Therefore Jihadi Salafis will not raise any national flag. If they’re raising #Syria's national flag they’re not Jihadi Salafis.

If they’re raising the black flag only, they may be Jihadi Salafis. (Saying they’re Alqaeda is a speculative jump from there.) #Syria

If they’re raising the black flag next to #Syria's independence flag, they are Islamic-inspired Syrian fighters, but not Jihadi Salafis.

So, recapping, there are Islamic-inspired fighters in #Syria. There are a few Jihadi Salafis. There may be Alqaeda but there’s no proof.

Once again the reason this is important is that to predict what these groups will do or plan strategically you gotta know them. #Syria

So after finishing with all of this I’m going to look back and see which part of this is scary and which is just overblown. #Syria

Of cousre I’m not vindicating Alqaeda but you gotta know them to know what can and cannot be attributed to them. #Syria

Now, if you interpret “Takfiri” more narrowly, then you can say that Salafi Jihadis do have an element of Takfir, and here’s how. #Syria

Some Salafis (not all, mind you) consider Shias and heretic Muslim sects to be infidels; in this specific case they’d be “takfiris”. #Syria

Note that this is a contentious issue even within Alqaeda. Zarqawi for example considered Shias infidels while Al-Zawahiri did not. #Syria

Now I can go into more details and nuances but let’s zoom out and see why this information is so important for #Syria's revolution.

The details I just narrated can help you predict the action of groups, and help you attribute certain actions to certain groups. #Syria

Takfiris for example will kill just about everyone (Algeria’s massacres come to mind), but even Alqaeda aren’t that kinda Takfiris. #Syria

That’s why when #Assad tried to pin the Houla massacre on Alqaeda I saw the BS there. #Syria

It’s probably easy to just look at all Jihadis as criminals but they’re ideologically inspired so you gotta read them right. #Syria

What Alqaeda (or Jihadi Salafis) would do is attack the regime with reckless abandon regardless of civilian casualties. #Syria

(Once again there’s no proof that Alqaeda is in #Syria, just Jihadi Salafi groups, and their presence is tiny and recent.)

Also, Jihadi Salafis may deliberate attack minorities, especially Alawites, with spectacular (suicide) attacks. #Syria

Importantly, Jihadi Salafis would be opportunistic, leaning towards spectacular attacks to give them a bigger size than they have. #Syria

Jihadi Salafis would also use statelessness to bring in recruits from all over the Arab/Muslim worlds. #Syria

Now looking at past few tweets I wonder, if there are established Jihadis in #Syria why didn’t we see suicide attacks on Alawite villages?

All of this leads me to believe that the Jihadi Salafi presence in #Syria is tiny and recent and not firmly established.

Now let me look at the regular Islamic-inspired fighters who aren’t Jihadi Salafis but just devout Syrian Muslims. #Syria

Those “regular” Islamic-inspired fighters will fight the regime along with the #FSA and won’t give trouble just as yet. #Syria

I mean, such Islamic-inspired fighters may raise the black flag; some may badmouth democracy; but won’t go on a Shia killing spree. #Syria

Anyway in light of all this, who should we be afraid of? Which groups would be truly nefarious and destructive to #Syria?

Non-Salafi Islamist fighters may give a hard time afterwards (will resist a secular state) but won’t destroy #Syria's society. Not scary.

Jihadi Salafis, especially non-Syrian, would be scary indeed and may have a deeply negative impact on #Syria's society.

Jihadi Salafis are right now a tiny faction but they can still launch spectacular suicide attacks to show a bigger size. #Syria

To sum up, the #FSA has Islamists, some may be Salafi, but #FSA is neither Alqaeda nor Jihadi Salafis. #Syria

It’s Suhoor time here so I have to take a break, but I’ll be back to discuss what the #FSA should do & what foreign powers should do. #Syria

BREAK

I’m back for a little while to complete this tweet session coz I’ll probably get too busy to do later. #Syria

I’ve talked about Islamists, Salafis, Jihadis, Alqaeda, Takfiris, and how all of that relates to #Syria & the #FSA.

One thing I missed is that whole “#Syria Jihadis are being funded by KSA & Qatar” issue, which I find rather BS.

As discussed earlier Salafi Jihadis believe that virtually all Muslim leaders are in fact infidels, KSA & Qatar included. #Syria

Salafi Jihadis hate all Muslim rulers, but have a special place for the rulers of the KSA whom they consider to be the worst. #Syria

In fact you can find impassioned diatribes against the KSA in the Salafi Jihadi library here: tawhed.ws (Arabic) #Syria

Basically, “Alqaeda is funded by KSA/Qatar” is a stupid statement. The KSA is Alqaeda’s sworn enemy. #Syria

For this reason I doubt Salafi Jihadis (especially Alqaeda) will ever want to have anything to do with the KSA or Qatar. #Syria

If Salafi Jihadis ever accept KSA help it would be on the basis of an intersection of interests, waiting for to pounce on them too. #Syria

Of course the KSA/Qatar know that nurturing Salafi Jihadis would be like keeping a scorpion for a pet. Eventually it’ll bite you. #Syria

Essentially if KSA & Qatar are funding any rebel party, it would be the #FSA itself rather than the Jihadi Salafis or Alqaeda. #Syria

And if Salafi Jihadis are getting any support from KSA (which I doubt) it would be from individual donors, not the state. #Syria

Finally I want to close this where I started - my year-long warning that #Syria can become a Jihadist magnet...

For #Syria to become a Jihadist magnet two things are required: attraction & opportunity.

The attraction factor isn’t lacking with enough bloody footage to recruit any sufficiently passionate/gullible young Muslim. #Syria

The opportunity however is recent - significant areas beyond regime control so Jihadist groups can slip in. #Syria

In fact, with regime control shrinking, Jihadists can not just slip in but actually set up shop and start operating. #Syria

To avoid this, both the #FSA and the world at large have responsibilities. The FSA must become more organized and centralized. #Syria

To avoid this, both the #FSA and the world at large have responsibilities. The FSA must become more organized and centralized. #Syria

The #FSA should also attempt some form of local governance in liberated areas, even if by the residents themselves. #Syria

Finally the #FSA must make a clear stand against any opportunistic groups attempting to establish their own command in #Syria.

If the #FSA is lousy & disorganized enough, such groups may be able to organize and operate in liberated #Syria.

However if the #FSA organizes and centralizes, and a credible provisional government is formed, things won’t get that bad. #Syria

As for the rest of the world, they must first realize the risks involved if #Syria devolves into a sectarian civil war.

If #Syria devolves into civil war it will spread to Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq; Jordan & Israel will suffer as well.

If #Syria or part of it become a Jihadi Salafi safe haven, the risk won’t be contained to Syria or even the Middle East alone.

I strongly believe that a major factor that made the world intervene in #Libya was to avoid it becoming a Jihadist magnet/safe haven. #Syria

With the mix of regime Migs, Jihadis, FSA gains & chemical weapons, I think a #Libya-style intervention in #Syria can be back on the table.

The worst outcome in #Syria would be a sectarian civil war. The best would be a totally peaceful, #Tahrir-style revolution.

However, right from the start we said that in #Syria we’re not looking for the best option but for the least bad exit.

Let’s not kid ourselves - #Syria under Assad will not have a Tahrir square. That ship as long sailed.

The least we can do, then, is make sure the worst of the worst outcomes (sectarian civil war) is avoided. #Syria

abuhatem
Here is Masyaf, #Syria today, a city with Ismaili, Jaafari Shia, and Alawi with few Sunnis - candles for dead martyr ►http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-y6rgXeeI8&feature=youtu.be

109 dead in #Syria today. 36 in Idlib, 19 in #Deir Ezzor, 17 in #Homs, 15 in #Hama, 10 in #Damascus, 6 in #Latakia, 5 in #Aleppo, 1 in #Daraa [LCC]

Assad burning & destroying his own country; shelling in more parts of #Syria today: ►http://twitpic.com/9vfkhf

Unbelievable the death toll in Syria today is 101 so far... Countless crimes against humanity committed by Assad forces daily in Syria. RIP

ProudShamieh
4 massacres took place in #Syria today in #Daraa #Latakia #Homs & #Idleb. About 100 civilians got killed by #Assad forces today.

abuhatem
Protest today in Salamiyeh, Syria today with an Ismaili Shia majority “Down with Bashar, God damn your soul oh Iran” ►https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dukCppYsOO0

65 martyrs in #Syria today.18 in #Idlib. 14 in #Daraa. 12 in #Homs. 11 in #Damascus Suburbs. 6 in #Damascus. 3 in #Hama. 1 in #DeirEzzor

protests all over #Syria today, met with live fire. Homs under constant shelling. more Syrians die as the world looks on

Ugarit News || Over 140 civilians were killed in Syria today (6 June). Among them 88 who were killed in #Hama alone, 78 of them in the Al-Qubair massacre.

NMSyria
The number of martyrs in #Syria today has risen to 140, including those slaughtered in a brutal massacre in #Hama. #QubairMassacre

SenJohnMcCain
Good conversation on crisis in #Syria today w/ @BBCRadio4’s World at One: ►http://huff.to/KPx9rU #wato

abuhatem
This is a village Hamah, Syria today being destroyed - this is what’s happening in Syria. This is Assad regime: ►http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9yC-hbJp464

Activists say 54 killed in Syria today. 13 in Latakia, 10 in Hama, 9 in Homs, 7 in Idlib, 6 in Damascus, 5 in Deir zor, 3 in Aleppo, 1 Deraa

Activists say 54 killed in Syria today. 13 in Latakia, 10 in Hama, 9 in Homs, 7 in Idlib, 6 in Damascus, 5 in Deir zor, 3 in Aleppo, 1 Deraa

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights

The current number of civilian martyrs in Syria today (Tuesday 5/6/2012), documented by the SOHR with name and reason of death, has risen to 22.

–Idlib province 5 civilians killed: 4 of them were killed in the town of Kafrou’id, which has witnessed intense clashes and regime bombardment that lasted until midnight. A man was killed in Deir Sanbal from wounds he suffered yesterday.

–Latakia province 4 civilians killed: They were all killed in the al-Hiffa area during the regime bombardment of the area, 2 of them were rebel fighters.

–Homs province 8 civilians killed: 3 bodies were found in Reef al-Qaseer, they belonged to people forcibly disappeared months ago. A woman was martyred in the eastern village of Buweida from wounds she suffered earlier. An unknown body was found near the national hospital in Teldu (Houla). 3 civilians were killed in the city of Homs, 2 were killed by regime fire in Jourat al-Shayyah and Dablan, the third died of earlier wounds.

–Dera’a province 3 civilians killed: One was shot dead during a regime raid campaign on the town of al-Shaikh Miskeen. A child was killed by the regime bombardment of the al-Lijat area. A woman from Homs was martyred when she was shot at the Syrian-Jordanian border.

–Aleppo province 1 civilian killed: A child was killed when Syrian troops used heavy machineguns in the city of A’zaz.

–Hama province 1 civilian killed: A citizen was shot dead by a sniper in the village of Kawkab.

–----

A defected soldier was killed when Syrian troops stormed the Souq al-Shajara district of Hama. A defected officer was killed during clashes in al-Hiffa, Lataki province.

At least 15 soldiers and security members were killed during clashes in al-Hiffa. Unknown gunmen assassinated a Syran colonel outside his house in the city of Deir Izzor. A brigadier general was killed when an explosive device went off in his car in Barzeh, Damascus.

Free Salama Kayla | Ibrahim al-Amin
►http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/free-salama-kayla

Salama Kayla is under arrest in Syria.

Routine news in a country like Syria today. Salama is a stubborn opponent of the regime in Syria. He also opposes partial compromises from any side, so he has a problem with the institutions of the Syrian regime. These attributes of his are what makes the news of his arrest routine.

But what does the arrest of an opponent like Salama Kayla mean? He has his own view of the crisis in Syria. He insists on approaching if from a class perspective, with a Marxist analysis of the economic and social causes of the protests that erupted in the country.

Salama does not support violence. He condemns it strongly when it comes from the regime, and firmly when it comes from the street. He does not presume to put others on trial or pass instant or even moral judgement. But even after everything that has happened, he has not abandoned his conviction that the responsibility lies chiefly with the regime. He also condemns all oppositionists who turn abroad, to any foreign party, let alone those who pander to NATO, or the oil sheikhdoms, or the West’s various clients.

By arresting him is the regime telling us that either it cannot tolerate any kind of opposition, or that it feels comfortable enough not to care what reaction there might be? The question is not about why he was arrested, but addresses whether there is space on the Syrian stage for opponents like Salama and his kind.